A “New” Racial Threat?
Examining the Political Implications of Ethno-religious Threat
Among White Americans

Camille D. Burge
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
Villanova University
camille.burge@villanova.edu

Willis Orlando
Program Officer
U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants
(USCRI)
worlando52@gmail.com

***PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE WITHOUT PERMISSION***
A “New” Racial Threat?

Examining the Political Implications of Ethno-religious Threat Among White Americans

While studies of racial threat are widespread, few studies have reckoned with the ways in which intersectional racial and religious identities affect Whites’ attitudes towards minorities. In this paper, we introduce a theory of ethno-religious threat to explain how White Americans respond to growing numbers of minorities with intersectional identities. We use GIS mapping to analyze demographic trends and voting patterns in the epicenter of Somali resettlement, Minnesota. We find that from 2000 to 2016, Whites in diversifying counties with growing Somali populations have shown greater support for Republican candidates than have Minnesotans as a whole. Our original survey experiment results confirm the causal role of ethno-religious threat: those who perceive the state’s diversification to be driven by Somali Muslims tend to favor highly restrictive immigration policies and aggressive anti-terrorism policies. Furthermore, we find that feelings of anxiety are strongly linked to these policy preferences.
The ways in which homogenously White communities react to growing minority populations has been a widely studied topic of interest since the publication of *Southern Politics* by V.O. Key in 1949. The racial threat hypothesis explains how White public opinion and political behavior bends toward conservative policies and candidates in diversifying contexts. Although this hypothesis was conceived in the context of the Black-White paradigm in the Jim Crow South, it has since been extended to understand Whites’ reactions to increasing amounts of Latinos (Pérez 2016), Muslims (Jamal 2008), and multi-racial groups (Oliver and Wong 2003). However, these binary explorations of racial threat provide us with an incomplete understanding of the full functioning of threat in politics because they do not account for how White people might respond to newcomers with intersectional identities, particularly those with racial and religious identities that are associated with negative stereotypes (Ochieng 2017; Shenoy 2016; Karoub et al 2017). This begs the following questions: how and in what ways might the influx of racial and religious newcomers shape Whites’ sociopolitical attitudes and voting behavior? To what extent might these attitudes be primarily driven by race/ethnicity, religion or some combination of the two?

In this paper, we argue that a modified version of the racial threat hypothesis holds relevance to our research questions, but that previous applications and adaptations of the theory have not adequately addressed the role of intersectional racial-religious identity in shaping White political attitudes. As such, we attempt to move the vast body of racial threat literature forward by coining the theory, *ethno-religious threat*, where we argue that the race/ethnicity and religion of the growing population in homogenously White communities influences White opinions and political decision-making. We begin by engaging the on-going debate over the *racial threat hypothesis* (Key 1949), focusing on the ways in which existing theory on White reactions to minorities might apply to ethno-religious threat. Prior to explaining how ethno-religious threat operates in political contexts; we describe the recent mass resettlement of refugees and immigrants of color in homogenously White communities. Next, we introduce our theory of *ethno-religious threat*. To assess the political implications of ethno-religious threat, we focus our attention on the state of
Minnesota, which has the largest Somali Muslim population in the United States (Abdi 2015, 173-175).

Why focus on Whites’ attitudes toward Somali Muslims in Minnesota? Extant literature suggests that White Americans possess negative stereotypes of both Blacks and Muslims. That is, Whites tend to associate Black people with being prone to criminality (Hurwitz and Peffley 2010; Holzer et al. 2006; Quillian and Pager 2001; Saperstein et al 2014) and Muslims with terrorism (Sides and Gross 2013; Kalkan et al 2009). The influx of Somali Muslims to the overwhelmingly White and homogenous state of Minnesota represents the perfect test case as Somali Muslims are racially ascribed as Black. We then present our hypotheses pertaining to the political implications of ethno-religious threat among Whites in Minnesota. Using United States Census and voting records data for nearly 20 years, we identify regional trends in demographic shifts and voting patterns in the state of Minnesota. We then use an original survey experiment to parse out whether perceived threat among White Minnesotans is driven primarily by ethnicity, religion, or both. By gauging Whites’ attitudes towards Blacks and Muslims in general, and Somalis in particular, we establish a causal link between the presence of a growing Somali Muslim population and White threat perceptions. Finally, we conclude by discussing the implications of our results and suggesting paths for future study.

Demographic Shifts and Changes in Whites Attitudes

How do the attitudes and behaviors of Whites change alongside demographic shifts? Perhaps the most influential theory related to White attitudes and the influx of minorities is the racial threat hypothesis. First proposed by Key (1949) in Southern Politics, this theory advances the notion that resistance to an outgroup (for Key, Blacks) will be strongest among members of an in-group (Whites) in areas where the out-group comprises a large portion of the population. In these situations, the out-group is assumed to compete with the in-group for limited social, political and economic resources, thus representing a tangible, material threat to the majority’s status. In Southern Politics, hostility towards the outgroup resulted in increased turnout in support of the overtly racist Democratic Party (Key 1949).
Similarly, Blumer’s (1958) theory of “race prejudice as a sense of group position” holds that racial animosity is not primarily a matter of individual affect or sentiment, but rather a result of a collective process through which racial groups are defined in opposition to one another. As part of his theory, Blumer (1958) forwards the notion that the sense of a “proprietary claim” to some material or social advantage is an essential component of race prejudice. This claim results in prejudice when members of an in-group perceive that members of an out-group represent a real or potential challenge or threat to their group’s collective advantages. As such, racial prejudice will increase as the number of individuals in a minority group increase, or as its access to such resources and advantages is perceived to increase and the majority’s access is perceived to decrease.

Integral to this theory is the idea that in-groups form and act in response to abstract images of out-groups, which are most effectively formed from afar. Thus, relative societal homogeneity lends itself to the formation of race prejudice, as in-group elites, members of the media and politicians can craft abstract images of out-groups without the complication of contending with ordinary citizens’ contradictory personal experiences. When pictures of a racial group are formed from personal experiences, the incoming group is less likely to be homogenized and abstracted, and race prejudice is less likely to form. This component of Blumer’s (1958) theory holds particular relevance for examinations of White attitudes in “new gateway” communities, as the historical racial and religious homogeneity of these areas lends itself to the formation of abstract images of racial and religious outsiders.

Since their original proposals, the racial threat hypothesis and the closely related theory of race prejudice as a sense of group position have been tested and adapted repeatedly, with the bulk of the scholarly work on these two theories focusing on the ways in which White Americans react to growing numbers of Black Americans. Scholars have found that Whites living in racially diverse areas are less likely to support affirmative action policies (Tolbert and Grummel 2003) and more likely to support “get tough”
welfare reforms that disproportionately affect Black people (Soss et al. 2001). Other studies have found that Whites living in areas that were originally majority White but have since diversified are more likely to hold racially conservative political attitudes and opinions (Brief et al. 2005; Glaser 1994) and that high levels of racial diversity have a negative, though complex, effect on interracial trust (Rudolph and Popp 2010). In some instances, these racially conservative political attitudes have been found to translate into support for overtly racist political candidates (Giles and Buckner 1993a), though these findings have been disputed (Voss 1996).

As racial demographics have shifted in the United States, scholars have adapted the foundational theories of racial threat and prejudice to try to make sense of evolving dynamics between Whites and other racial groups as well as between native-born citizens and immigrants. Bobo and Hutchings (1996) confirmed the notion that perceptions of threat in multi-racial contexts can be borne of racial alienation, self-interest, stratification beliefs, and most importantly for this study, prejudice. Similar results come from a more recent study by McClain et al. (2007) conducted in a “new gateway” city with a historically high Black population experiencing a sharp increase in immigration from Latin America. The authors’ results represented an affirmation of the basic tenants of the racial threat hypothesis, with touches of Blumer’s emphasis on group position by showing that animosity towards a growing minority group from the established population (in this case both Blacks and Whites) may be based on a combination of real or perceived material threat as well as the holding of stereotypical opinions about the incoming group. This research tends to focus on racial threat in a binary context: Black or White, Latino or White, Asian or White. As such, it does not explore how Whites might feel threatened by intersectional identities like one’s racial identity coupled with an additional identity like religion.

The Concept of ‘New Gateways’ and Somali Resettlement in Minnesota

This paper focuses on the epicenter of Somali resettlement, Minnesota, a state that while still predominately White has seen the White share of its population shrink rapidly in recent years. Refugees
and immigrants from Central America and Mexico resettled through the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) have begun settling in large numbers in communities throughout the Midwest and South that have not traditionally hosted significant numbers of immigrants. These “new gateway” communities, described by Waters and Jiménez (2005), are characterized by inexpensive housing, low unemployment, and abundant low-wage jobs, often in light manufacturing or “agribusiness.”

While these “new gateway” communities offer opportunities for new immigrants, particularly those with limited English skills or formal education, they also present a number of challenges for White residents. Since “new gateway” communities by definition have not received a steady stream of immigrants in their recent histories, residents’ experiences with outsiders are often quite limited. This may translate into a rocky transition period for local service providers such as county welfare offices and schools, who are tasked with quickly learning the cultural particularities of newcomers who are often in dire need of (and legally entitled to) their services. An abundance of evidence suggests that these newcomers, be they immigrants from Latin America or the Caribbean or refugees from further afield, are filling jobs employers have struggled to fill with native workers. Although these employment opportunities help to improve the economic fortunes of their new communities, in economically depressed areas with stagnant wages and high inequality, highly visible new immigrants are often used as scapegoats for various economic ills by frustrated local residents and opportunistic politicians (Shaid and Grossman 2007).

“New gateway” communities vary in their general demographic profiles. In Minnesota, the last major waves of immigration came from the Scandinavian countries and Germany from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century (Gunderson 1999). As immigrants and refugees from the “global south” started to arrive in larger numbers a century later, these communities were, for the first time, faced with newcomers who varied from the local population both in terms of racial ascription and
religion. In addition to Mexican immigrants, who are the largest group of newcomers to Minnesota, two of the largest groups to settle in Minnesota have been Hmong refugees from Laos and Vietnam and, our focus, Somalis (American Immigration Council 2015). While history tells us that native populations often react with hostility when faced with unfamiliar new immigrants, it is less clear whether local residents’ hostility is driven by one particular aspect of the newcomers’ perceived identity, or by a combination thereof.

An Ethno-religious Threat? An Intersectional Approach to White Minnesotans’ Reactions to Somali Muslims

Scholars in both political science and sociology research the ways in which intersectional identities shape one’s lived experience (Crenshaw 1989, 1991; Collins 1990; Allen 2013; Simien 2007; Hancock 2016). Political science literature examining interlocking systems of oppression tends to focus on the extent to which racial and gender identities or racial and class identities might affect one’s policy opinions or political behavior (Gay and Tate 1998; Clawson and Clark 2003; Simien and Clawson 2004; Simien 2007; Bedolla and Scola 2006; Steinbugler, Press, and Dias 2006; Carter, Corra, and Carter 2009; Harris-Perry 2011; Fullerton and Stern 2013; Capers and Smith 2016; Collins 2017; Stout, Kretschmer, and Ruppanner 2017). However, less is known about the intersection of racial/ethnic and religious identities. In the context of Black Americans, scholars explore how one’s Christian and racial identity shape policy opinions and political decision-making (Calhoun-Brown 1996; Cohen 1999; McKenzie 2004; Mcclerking and McDaniel 2005; McDaniel and Ellison 2008; Liu, Austin, and Orey 2009; McKenzie and Rouse 2013). Again, this literature explains the intersectional identities of Black Americans and does not examine how Whites might feel about the racial and religious identities of other groups. Beyond the United States, scholars examining these identities in politics focus on ethno-religious conflicts in various countries and the ways in which these conflicts shape intergroup relations (Fox 2000; Searle 2002; Agbiboa 2013; Ukiwo 2003; DeVotta and Stone 2008; Holder 2016; Kanas et al 2015).
Thus, the literature remains relatively silent as it pertains to how White people might view individuals with intersectional racial and religious identities in the United States; we aim to fill this void.

In this paper, we argue that outsized attention and hostility directed towards Somalis may be explained by Somalis’ dual status as Black and Muslim in predominately White Christian communities. That is, the White and overwhelmingly Christian majority in Minnesota, faced with a growing and politically visible Black Muslim population, may feel doubly threatened by the newcomers, increasing hostility and altering political behavior. In spite of their overall utility, there are several problems with applying the previously discussed theories to the case of Somalis in the “new gateways” of the Midwest. First, in the types of communities under investigation, Somalis do not constitute a large portion of the local populations. In some small meatpacking towns Somalis constitute up to a quarter of the local populations (Schaid and Grossman 2007), but they do not make up more than five-percent of the population in any city in the United States with a population of over 50,000. Even in Minneapolis, Minnesota and Columbus, Ohio, home to the largest Somali populations in the United States, Somalis make up less than five-percent of the population.¹ This, combined with the fact that large portions of the Somali communities in question are non-citizens who are ineligible to vote, and Somalis’ lack of economic clout (according to the American Community Survey, the median Somali American household made just $22,368 in 2014), make it seem unlikely that large numbers of White citizens find themselves in direct competition with Somalis for limited social, political or economic resources. As such, the notion that Whites experience an acute sense of social, political or economic threat from incoming Somalis

¹ U.S. Bureau of the Census American Community Survey 2015 estimates, based on populations reporting Sub-Saharan African ancestry. Estimates based on the population reporting Somali ancestry show that no Minnesota county is more than 3.92% Somali. The number of Somalis in Columbus, Ohio, home to several other foreign-born African communities, was estimated based on information from the Somali Community Association of Ohio www.somaliohio.org.
seems inadequate to explain widespread anti-Somali hostility as almost all extant theories of racial threat and positive contact presume that in order for a dramatic effect to take place, a minority group must be relatively substantial numerically.

An exception comes from Hopkins (2010) whose politicized places hypothesis combined elements from both Key (1949) and Blumer (1958), while adding an emphasis on rates of population change and national level media attention. For Hopkins, majority groups are most likely to feel a threat to their relative group position when a minority group is rapidly increasing in numbers (that is, the relative rate of population increase takes precedence over raw population size), and this increase is highlighted by national level media attention and political rhetoric. This perspective is consistent with findings by Oliver and Mendelberg (2000), who argued that racial animosity may be more closely related to socio-environmental factors than to pure demographics, concluding that, “the environmental sources of White racial hostility may work less through realistic conflict over resources than through psychological states that produce out-group animosity” (587). The implication is that even in the absence of tangible challenges to the majority’s group position, perceptions of change or the anticipation of change can be enough to provoke a threat response based on stereotyped expectations of a non-White group (Cooter 2013; Goyette et al 2012; Pettigrew et al 2010).

Theorizing and Hypothesizing about the Ethno-Religious Threat in Minnesota

Rather than posing a material threat to White group position, as Key (1949) and Blumer (1958) would have assumed to be necessary to elicit White backlash, Somalis in Minnesota may instead represent an existential psychological threat to the majority. In keeping with Hopkins (2010) and Oliver and Mendelberg (2000), we argue that Somali Muslims present an ethno-religious threat to White Americans. We posit that it is not about realistic conflict over economic resources nor the low volume of these newcomers, but rather the rate at which they are increasing and the negative stereotypes associated with both Blacks and Muslims. Blacks’ perceived proneness to criminality (Hurwitz and Peffley 2010;
Holzer et al. 2006; Quillian and Pager 2001; Saperstein et al 2014) and Muslims perceived associations with terrorism (Sides and Gross 2013; Kalkan et al 2009) might reveal a psychological feeling of threat that has implications for Whites’ policy opinions and political behavior.

Extant literature on the racial threat hypothesis finds that increases in the size of the Black population shapes White voting behavior. Specifically, this research finds that Whites are more likely to vote for conservative candidates as the racial demographics change (Giles and Buckner 1993; Giles and Hertz 1994). Newer research surrounding the implications of the racial threat hypothesis examines Whites’ voting behavior in the presence of increasing amounts of Latinos and Asians and finds that increases in these racial and ethnic minorities lead Whites to support conservative policies and Republican candidates (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Rocha and Espino 2009). Therefore, we hypothesize that as the number of Somalis in Minnesota increase, White Minnesotans should be more likely to support Republican candidates for the United States House of Representatives (H1).

But what is it in particular about Somalis that makes them more threatening than, for example, Hmong refugees, who have settled in Minnesota in comparable numbers over the last two decades but who are the subject of little media and public backlash? One possible explanation is religion. In the post 9/11 political landscape, scholars have begun to examine the ways in which Muslim group identity has been constructed in political and popular discourse, and in turn, the ways in which non-Muslims in the United States perceive their Muslim neighbors. Laying the groundwork for examinations of Muslims as a potentially threatening “outgroup,” Kalkan et al (2009) show that both before and after the September 11, 2001 attacks, affect towards Muslims among survey respondents in the United States has been closely linked with affect towards other racial/religious (such as Black Americans and Jews) and cultural outgroups (such as immigrants and the LGBT community). Although the Muslim population in the United States has a high degree of internal heterogeneity in terms of racial ascription, nativity, and country of ancestry, it has been theorized that many Americans lump all Muslims together into a single
otherized group (Jamal 2008, 116). And it is not only non-Muslims who racialize Muslim identity. Alimahomed (2011) argues that even young Arab American Muslims, who are officially categorized as “White” for census purposes, have begun to see themselves as part of an altogether separate, nonwhite group. If both Muslims and non-Muslims have begun to perceive of Muslims as an otherized racial/ethnic group, it is conceivable that racial threat theories may be applied to help to explain some degree of anti-Muslim hostility. In the context of a racialized, homogenous Muslim identity, scholars have found higher levels of support for several aspects of the “War on Terror” among non-Muslims in general (Jamal 2008), those holding negative stereotypes of Muslims (Sides and Gross 2013) and those who hold ethnocentric attitudes (Kam and Kinder 2007). In this light, we hypothesize that increases in Somali Muslims should increase White support of conservative policies on terrorism (H2).

Scholars examining Whites’ attitudes about immigration focus on the extent to which the threat induced by the newcomers is economic, cultural, or a combination of the two. Brader et al (2008) argue that reactions to immigrants depend on who the immigrants are. Although focusing on Latinos, Brader et al (2008) argue that the identity of immigrants matters because negative stereotypes about the incoming group might increase concerns about cultural assimilation, consumption of resources, and crime (960). Somali Muslims might occupy an interesting space in the minds of White Minnesotans as their identities, being ascribed as Black and identifying as Muslim, are both connected with negative stereotypes: Blacks have been cognitively linked to criminality in the minds of Whites (Peffley and Hurwitz 2002; Hurwitz and Peffley 2005; Quillian and Pager 2001; Thompson and Bobo 2011) and Muslims linked to terrorism (Sides and Gross 2013; Akhtar 2011; Jamal 2008; Green 2015a; Gotanda 2011). Given these negative stereotypes related to both the racial and religious identities of Somalis, we expect increases in Somali Muslims to lead to increased support for restrictive immigration policies among Whites (H3a).

---

2 See Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) for an excellent review of attitudes toward immigration.
On November 6, 2016, then presidential candidate Donald Trump visited Minneapolis two days before the election to discuss the danger posed by Somali migrants. Mr. Trump stated, “Here in Minnesota, you’ve seen first-hand the problems caused with faulty refugee vetting, with very large numbers of Somali refugees coming into your state without your knowledge, without your support or approval…Some of them [are] joining Isis and spreading their extremist views all over our country and all over the world” (Johnson and Sullivan 2016). Although the anti-Muslim sentiments stoked during this rally represent the anxieties and fears that many Minnesotans face with increasing numbers of religious newcomers, it overlooks how Whites’ attitudes towards Somali Muslims might be further complicated as most of these immigrants are racially ascribed as Black. Pundits often describe the double dose of discrimination that Black Muslims face in the United States because of the negative stereotypes associated with their racial and religious identities. Several scholars also argue that knowing the racial and ethnic composition of the incoming group might trigger different emotional reactions (Brader et al 2008; Gadarian and Albertson 2014). Specifically, research surrounding the presence of new immigrants focuses on the extent to which these individuals trigger feelings of anxiety and suggest that it is the feelings of anxiety that lead to reduced levels of support for immigration (Brader et al 2008; Gadarian and Albertson 2014). Therefore, we expect that as Somali Muslims increase, Whites’ levels of anxiety might serve as the mechanism driving attitudes about immigration (H3b).

Methods

Our methodology is twofold. First, we use GIS mapping to establish the presence of a racial threat and to assess whether shifts in demographics are coupled with a trend towards voting for more conservative candidates. We compiled raw race and ethnicity data on the county level in the state of
Minnesota to detect changes in demographics from 2000 to 2015. We then collected county-level and United States House of Representatives district-level voting data for every national congressional election between 2000 and 2016. Findings from such an analysis demonstrate associations between population change and vote choice.

Second, we conduct an original survey experiment to disentangle whether threat among Whites is being driven by the race or religion of newcomers or some combination of the two. We examine the implications of this threat and observe the implications for one’s policy opinions and political participation. Participants were recruited through Qualtrics, which is an opt-in survey community. Members receive invitations to complete surveys via email. In exchange, they receive chances to win lotteries, points that can be converted to cash, and other prizes. We commissioned Qualtrics to collect data from approximately 500 White Minnesotans. Our total sample contains responses from 556 self-identified White Minnesotans. The ages of respondents in our sample range from 19 to 93 but the average age is 48. Our sample consists of 290 women and 266 men that, on average, have an Associate’s Degree and a family income ranging from $60,000 to $69,000. The average respondent ideologically identifies as Liberal to moderate and only slightly leans Democrat.

An email invitation to participate in the study was sent by Qualtrics in August of 2017. Prospective participants were told that the purpose of the study was to examine attitudes about demographic changes in the state of Minnesota. Upon providing consent, respondents answered a series of demographic questions related to gender, age, education, and income. Respondents were then instructed to read an article describing demographic changes in the state of Minnesota, and to answer the

---

3 All demographic data comes from the United States Bureau of the Census at www.census.gov. Figures for non-census years were taken from Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS), which provides population estimates on a yearly basis. See https://factfinder.census.gov

4 See Appendix for test statistics, which indicate balance in our covariates.

5 Our study ran from Friday, August 19, 2017 to Friday, August 26, 2017.
questions that followed. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of five conditions; each of which credited the changing demographics in the state of Minnesota to Somalis, Somali Muslims, Blacks, Black Muslims, and Muslims; thus allowing us to disentangle whether the threat is being driven by race/ethnicity, religion or some combination of the two. All respondents were then asked to rate their attitudes about immigration, terrorism, and the likelihood of voting for a candidate that supported increasing the number of immigrants in the state of Minnesota. In addition to our key dependent variables, we asked respondents how anxious they felt about the information presented in the article.

**Results: Demographic Shifts in Minnesota from 2000 to 2015**

Minnesota has historically been and remains an overwhelmingly White state. However, between 2000 and 2015, the percentage of Minnesotans who were White declined from 89.4% to 84.78%, a drop of 4.62%, which is depicted in Figure 1a. Simultaneously, the percentage of Minnesotans who were Black increased from 3.5% to 5.52%. As is to be expected, some of the largest shifts in demographics occurred in the state’s most diverse region, the Twin Cities (Hennepin and Ramsey counties), shown in Figure 1b, where White populations dropped by 6.23 and 5.56 percentage points and Black populations increased by 3.17 and 3.55 percentage points respectively.

---

6 See appendix for treatment conditions.

7 See appendix for question text.
However, surprisingly, and more pertinent to our research agenda is the fact that major changes took place outside of Minneapolis-St. Paul. As one can see in Figure 1c, in 2000, the population of the 85 non-Twin Cities counties in Minnesota was 94.34% White, and just 1.00% Black. By 2015, the White population in these counties had decreased by almost four percentage points, to 90.42%, while Blacks
had more than doubled as a percentage of the population, accounting for 2.56% of residents of these counties. Relating back to Blumer (1958), we should expect increases in demographic outsiders to have a particularly strong impact in these historically homogenous counties, as locals’ perceptions of racial and religious minorities will likely have been formed from a distance, and are more likely to be colored by media portrayals of the newcomers (Hopkins 2010), creating more room for the flourishing of racial and religious stereotypes. Including the Twin Cities, 41 of 87 Minnesota counties saw their White populations drop by more than 2 percentage points, and 56 counties saw their Black communities more than double as a percentage of the overall population.

**Figure 1c. Demographic Changes in Minnesota, excluding Minneapolis-St. Paul, 2000-2015**

![Chart showing demographic changes](image)

Data on Somali ancestry is not available at the county level prior to 2010. However, a rapidly increasing Somali population is still evident from the limited 2010-2015 data. The percentage of Minnesotans specifying ancestry who identified as Somali increased from 1.21% to 1.48% from 2010 to 2015.

---

8 Somali ancestry data comes from the 2010 census and the 2011-2015 American Community Surveys (https://factfinder.census.gov), based on a sample of all respondents specifying ancestry. Respondents can specify more than one country of ancestry, so those categorized as “Somali” may well have specified other countries of origin as well.
2015. In 2010, only 11 counties, including the Twin Cities, had populations that were at least 1% Somali and only 3 counties were at least 2% Somali. While only 2 additional counties joined the “over 1% Somali” club, by 2015 the number of counties that were at least 2% Somali has almost tripled to 8 (one additional county counted 1.97% of its residents as Somali). And census figures also indicate that Somalis began moving into some new counties. Seven counties that registered as 0.0% Somali in 2010 had identifiable Somali populations by 2015, indicating a trend towards dispersion throughout some of the state’s more rural regions.

**Ethnoreligious Threat and Voting Trends in Minnesota from 2000 to 2016**

County-level and United States House District level data was collected for every national Congressional election between 2000 and 2016\(^9\). Though voting trends have waxed and waned with national political developments (for example, the state’s Democrats turned out in large numbers in 2008), as displayed in Figure 2a, overall the state has trended Republican over the last nine national Congressional elections. While overall voter turnout increased for both major parties over the last 16 years, as the overall population increased, Republican participation has increased at a greater rate than has Democratic participation. In 2000, 52.21% of Minnesotans supported Democratic Congressional candidates, with just 42.03% supporting Republicans. By 2016, the Democratic share of Congressional votes had dropped slightly to 51.72%, while the Republican share increased substantially to 48.12%.

---
\(^9\) All election results are from the Minnesota Secretary of State’s website at http://electionresults.sos.state.mn.us/
Critically for our study, this change has been much more striking outside of the historically more diverse (relative to the rest of the state) Twin Cities. As Figure 2b shows, in 2000, 54.10% of non-Hennepin or Ramsey county Minnesota voters supported a Democratic Congressional candidate, while just 42.18% supported a Republican. That is, the non-Twin Cities voters were actually more likely to support a Democrat than were those in the Twin Cities. By 2016, the tables had turned, with 52.75% of non-Twin Cities voters supporting Republican candidates, and 47.12% of these voters supporting Democrats.

Figure 2b. Vote Shares in U.S. House Elections in Minnesota, excluding Minneapolis-St. Paul, Presidential Vote Years, 2000-2016
Some of the most striking changes occurred in the same counties where White populations were decreasing and Somali populations were increasing. For example, in Stearns County, the Republican vote share almost doubled, from 31.67% in 2000 to 61.17% in 2016. From 2000 to 2015, the White population in Stearns County decreased by 4.96 percentage points and the Black population increased by 2.95 percentage points. A large portion of this increase in the Black population was driven by Somalis, whose population share more than doubled from 1.11% to 2.55% in the same period.

While overall trends are difficult to read due to the surge of Democratic voters in 2008 and to a lesser extent 2012, Figures 3a and 3b provide GIS maps of county-level data suggesting a tentative link between declining White populations outside of the Twin Cities and increasing support for Republican Congressional candidates. Of 13 Minnesota counties that were at least 1% Somali in 2015, we identified 10 as likely sites of heightened ethno-religious threat. These were counties outside of the Twin Cities that experienced a drop in the White population of at least 2 percentage points between 2000 and 2015, and where the growing Somali and/or Black population increased by at least 1 percentage point. In these same counties, the Republican share of the United States House of Representatives vote increased from 48% to 52% between 2000 and 2016, while the Democratic share held steady at 48%. Democrats retained the majority of the House vote in the rest of the state, with their candidates winning 53% of all voters outside of the 10 identified counties in 2016. We believe these findings provide baseline support for our first hypothesis, which argues that as the number of Somali Muslims increase, Whites in Minnesota are more likely to support Republican candidates.
Figure 3a: Demographic Changes by County, 2000-2015 White Population Share

![Map showing demographic changes by county with color coding for population share changes.](http://www.census.gov)

Figure 3b: House Votes by County 2000-2016, Change in Republican Vote Share

![Map showing change in house votes by county with color coding for vote share changes.](http://electionresults.sos.state.mn.us)
The Causal Role of Ethnoreligious Threat in White Public Opinion and Political Behavior

While our previous results lend credence to the idea that increases in ethnic and religious newcomers are associated with more conservative voting in the state of Minnesota, we conduct a survey experiment to further understand the extent to which Whites’ attitudes and behavior might be caused by influxes of individuals with intersectional identities. In this survey experiment we vary the racial/ethnic and religious identity of newcomers to the state of Minnesota and examine how increases in Blacks, Black Muslims, Somalis, Somali Muslims, and Muslims shape one’s likelihood to vote for a candidate that supports increasing diversity, attitudes toward immigration, and attitudes about terrorism. We provide average differences across our experimental conditions with 95% confidence intervals. The statistical significance depicted in the following figures is determined by the difference between those assigned to the Blacks condition and those assigned to the remaining conditions (Black Muslims, Somalis, Somali Muslims, and Muslims). In some instances we also highlight the differences between those assigned to the Black Muslims and Somali Muslims conditions to demonstrate that the threat seems to be more pronounced among those in the ethno-religious condition. All of our dependent variables are rescaled from 0 to 1 for comparability.

Figure 4 provides average differences in the likelihood of voting for a candidate that supports increasing immigrants in the state of Minnesota. In Figure 4, the variable is coded so that “1” indicates that the respondent is extremely likely to vote for a candidate that supports increasing the number of immigrants in the state of Minnesota. Our findings in Figure 4 reveal that those assigned to the Blacks condition are most likely to support voting for a candidate that increases diversity in the state, while those in the Somali Muslims condition are least likely to vote for a candidate that supports increasing the number of immigrants in Minnesota (p<.05). Statistically significant differences between those assigned to the Blacks condition and those in the Somalis (p<.10) and Muslims (p<.10) condition also abound. Our findings suggest that when Whites perceive diversity in their state to be driven by Somalis, Muslims, or Somali Muslims, they are less likely to support voting for a candidate that plans to increase the
number of immigrants. We believe these findings lend causal support to the associations we found with the demographic and voting trends data; that is, as diversity in the state of Minnesota increases, people are far more willing to support conservative candidates and less willing to vote for individuals that might support increasing immigrants or refugees.

Figure 4: Likelihood of Voting for a Candidate that Will Increase Immigration

\[\text{Note: } * p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01\]

Our findings in Figure 5 highlight the relationship between increasing newcomers, attitudes toward terrorism, and policies designed to reduce terrorism. We asked respondents how worried they were about a terrorist attack and their attitudes about whether federal spending on defense should be increased. Both variables indicate that our respondents are most likely to support conservative policies on terrorism when the group increasing in numbers is Somali Muslims. When compared to respondents in the increasing Blacks condition, those in the Somali Muslims condition are more likely to worry about a terrorist attack happening in the near future (p<.05) and more likely to support increasing federal spending on defense (p<.10). When comparing respondents in the Black Muslims and Somali Muslims conditions, those assigned to the Somali Muslims condition are more supportive of increasing federal spending on defense (p<.10). Perhaps most striking are the differences between those assigned to the Somali Muslims and Muslims condition; those assigned to the Somali Muslim condition are more likely to be worried about a terrorist attack (p<.10) and more likely to support increased spending on defense.
These results provide broad support for our second hypothesis: increases in Somali Muslims increase White support for conservative policies on terrorism.

Extant literature surrounding attitudes toward terrorism suggests that the media has played an important role in explicitly and implicitly linking terrorism to Islam (Green 2015b; Gerges 1997; Akhtar 2011; Sides and Gross 2013). Perhaps in Minnesota, the media is more likely to link acts of terrorism to Somali Muslims than other groups but it is difficult to draw these conclusions with the evidence provided from this study. This position gains some support from a brief Lexis Nexus query, which showed that between August 1, 2016 and August 1, 2017, 31.2% of all articles in the Minneapolis Star-Tribune that contained the search term “terrorism” also mentioned the term “Somali”. By contrast, just 1.7% of USA Today articles containing the search term “terrorism” also contained the search term “Somali”. We believe these findings are deserving of further scrutiny.

![Figure 5: Attitudes about Terrorism](image)

Note: +p<.10; **p<.05; p<.01***
Figure 6 provides support for our third hypothesis pertaining to immigration policies. When comparing individuals assigned to the Blacks condition to those in the Somali Muslim condition, we find that those assigned to the Somali Muslim condition are more likely to favor a temporary ban of all refugees ($p < .05$), more likely to support a travel ban ($p < .06$), and more likely to believe that immigrants take jobs away from people already in the United States ($p < .10$). Across all of our dependent variables, those assigned to the Somali Muslims condition have the most conservative positions on immigration.

**Figure 6: Attitudes Toward Immigration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supports Temporary Ban of All Refugees</th>
<th>Supports Travel Ban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.41 ± 0.01</td>
<td>0.44 ± 0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.43 ± 0.02</td>
<td>0.49 ± 0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.45 ± 0.03</td>
<td>0.53 ± 0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.51** ± 0.04</td>
<td>0.54** ± 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.48 ± 0.02</td>
<td>0.53** ± 0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigrants Take Jobs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.54 ± 0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.55 ± 0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.58 ± 0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.62* ± 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.60 ± 0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *$p < .10$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$***

Research on the role of anxiety in immigration attitudes suggests that as one’s anxiety increases, one might become more willing to support restrictive immigration policies (Brader et al 2008; Gadarian and Albertson 2014). As such, we plotted the predicted probabilities derived from OLS regression models of favoring a temporary ban of all refugees. Figure 7 provides broad support for our
expectations: when compared to those in the Blacks condition, the willingness to favor a temporary ban for those assigned to the Somali Muslims condition is influenced by the experience of anxiety. That is, as one’s anxiety increases, individuals assigned to the Somali Muslims condition also increase in their likelihood to favor a temporary ban of all refugees to the United States. Thus, it appears that our respondents’ attitudes about the temporary banning all refugees are indeed influenced by their experience of anxiety.

Figure 7: Adjusted Predictions of Strongly Favoring a Temporary Ban by Anxiety

Baseline=Blacks

Discussion and Conclusion

The purpose of this paper is to understand the ways in which an ethno-religious threat shapes Whites’ opinions and voting behavior. Our methodology was twofold. First, we gathered data on demographic and voting trends to assess whether increases in diversity, and Somali Muslims specifically, were associated with increases in support for Republicans. Our findings were largely confirmed: the Republican share of the vote in United States House races has increased to an absolute majority in
Minnesota counties experiencing declining White populations and growing Somali and/or Black populations since 2000. In the rest of the state, Democrats have retained the majority of Minnesotans’ United States House votes. Second, we conducted a survey experiment to further examine whether voting behavior and attitudes toward immigration and terrorism were caused by increases in Blacks, Somali Muslims, Black Muslims, Somalis, or Muslims. We found support for our hypotheses pertaining to increases in Somali Muslims driving support for more restrictive immigration policies and more conservative stances on terrorism policies. Our findings indicate that Somali Muslims’ dual status as phenotypically Black and Muslim increase threat perceptions among White Minnesotans and lead to differences in voting behavior and policy opinions. Although not statistically significant in most instances, we would like to note that the difference between respondents assigned to the Somali Muslims and Muslims conditions trend in the right direction. That is, respondents in the Somali Muslims condition do possess more restrictive attitudes pertaining to terrorism and immigration those in the Muslims condition. We hope to conduct more experimental research in Minnesota to further understand how reactions to these groups prime different considerations.

Extant literature in political science explicitly focuses on how Whites might feel threatened by increasing populations of racial outgroups and how these increases shape their public opinion and political decision-making. However, if we are to truly understand the full functioning of threat and prejudice on White policy opinion and behavior in American politics, it might behoove us to examine how Whites might react towards individuals with intersectional racial and religious identities. Indeed, perhaps most notable for this paper are the distinctions that White Minnesotans draw between Blacks and Somali Muslims. If White Minnesotans viewed both of these groups as equally threatening, our findings would not indicate statistically significant differences between these two groups in our survey experiment. Our findings contribute to and extend the research of both Key (1949) and Blumer (1958) by suggesting that a “new” racial threat is on the horizon; an ethno-religious threat. In the future,
scholars should consider how Whites’ perceptions of individuals with ethno-religious identities might shape their politics.

References


https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/98077.


Appendix

I. Treatment Conditions

Our treatment conditions were created from an article we found in a Minnesota newspaper and a USA Today article that discussed the changing demographics of the state. See the following links for more details: [http://www.twincities.com/2011/04/16/minorities-drove-the-majority-of-minnesotas-growth-over-past-decade/](http://www.twincities.com/2011/04/16/minorities-drove-the-majority-of-minnesotas-growth-over-past-decade/)  

MINNESOTA'S COMMUNITIES ARE RAPIDLY DIVERSIFYING, DRIVEN BY INCREASING [INSERT RACIAL/RELIGIOUS GROUP]

Associated Press

Minnesota’s population increased about 15 percent between 2000 and 2010. Much of this increase was due not to an increase in native-born Minnesotans, but to large numbers of Somali Muslims/Black Muslims/Somalis/Blacks/Muslims moving to the state from out of state/overseas.

Racial, ethnic, and religious diversity is spreading far beyond the coasts and into surprising places across the United States, rapidly changing how Americans live, learn, work and worship together — and even who our neighbors are.

Cities and towns far removed from traditional urban gateways such as New York, Miami, Chicago and San Francisco are rapidly becoming some of the most diverse places in America, an analysis of demographic data by the Associated Press shows, and Minnesota is no exception.

In Minnesota, much of this population shift can be attributed to Somali Muslims/Black Muslims/Somalis/Blacks/Muslims who have flocked to the state in large numbers over the last two decades. Catering to this shift, Somali Muslim/Black Muslim/Somali/Black/Muslim grocery stores, businesses, and churches/mosques can now be seen in communities that a short time ago were almost entirely populated by native-born whites.

While such a population shift is perhaps to be expected in the Twin Cities, small metro areas such as Rochester and St. Cloud and even more remote towns — including Willmar and Marshall — have seen a stunning surge in newcomers, making those places far more diverse. “Visually, it’s noticeable. You see more black people/Somali/Black Muslims/Somali Muslims/Muslims walking around,” said Julie Thompson, a white woman who moved to Woodbury in 2000 from Kansas City.

Many of these newcomers have been attracted to the state’s relatively low cost of living, abundant jobs, and the established presence of Somali Muslim/Black Muslim/Somali/Black/Muslim communities. Minnesotans will have ample opportunity to adapt, because for now, the flow of Somali Muslims/Black Muslims/Somalis/Blacks/Muslims to the state shows no sign of slowing as future projections indicate that members of Somali Muslims/Black Muslims/Somalis/Blacks/Muslims could become the majority in some of these small towns in as little as five to ten years.

What this means for native Minnesotans remains unclear. While advocates praise Minnesota for its openness to outsiders, others worry that the influx of Somali Muslims/Black Muslims/Somalis/Blacks is causing dramatic population shifts, altering traditional ways of life and making some communities virtually unrecognizable.
II. Dependent Variable Question Text
The dependent and control variables all appear in the American National Election Studies Surveys. All of the dependent variable questions were randomized in our experiment.

Thinking about the article you just read, to what extent do you feel anxious?
- Not at all
- Very slightly
- A little
- Moderately
- Quite a bit
- Extremely

How strongly do you favor or oppose the temporary stopping of all refugee admissions to the United States?
- Strongly favor
- Somewhat favor
- Neither favor nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Strongly oppose

How strongly do you favor or oppose a temporary ban on travel to the United States for individuals from Somalia, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Iran, and Sudan?
- Strongly favor
- Somewhat favor
- Neither favor nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Strongly oppose

How likely is it that recent immigration levels will take jobs away from people already here?
- Extremely likely
- Very likely
- Moderately likely
- Slightly likely
- Not likely at all

In the next election, how likely are you to vote for a candidate that supports increasing the amount of immigrants/refugees in the state of Minnesota?
- Extremely likely
- Very likely
• Moderately likely
• Slightly likely
• Not likely at all

How worried are you that the United States will experience a terrorist attack in the near future?
• Extremely worried
• Very worried
• Moderately worried
• Slightly worried
• Not at all worried

Should federal spending for defense be increased, decreased or kept about the same?
• Increased
• Decreased
• Kept about the same

You just indicated that federal spending for defense should be increased. Should it be increased a great deal, a moderate amount or a little?
• A great deal
• A moderate amount
• A little

You just indicated that federal spending on defense should be decreased. Should it be decreased a great deal, a moderate amount or a little?
• A great deal
• A moderate amount
• A little

III. Control Variable Question Text

What is your age?

What is your gender?
• Female
• Male

What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have completed?
• 8th grade or less
• Attended high school
- High school graduate/GED
- Some college but no degree
- Associate's Degree
- Bachelor's Degree
- Advanced Degree

Last year, that is in 2016, what was your total family income from all sources before taxes?
- Less than $10,000
- $10,000 - $19,999
- $20,000 - $29,999
- $30,000 - $39,999
- $40,000 - $49,999
- $50,000 - $74,999
- $75,000 - $99,999
- $100,000 - $149,999
- $150,000 or more

We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from very liberal to very conservative. Where would you place yourself upon this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?
- Very Liberal
- Liberal
- Slightly Liberal
- Moderate/Middle of the Road
- Slightly Conservative
- Conservative
- Very Conservative
- I haven’t thought about this very much

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or something else?
- Republican
- Democrat
- Independent
- Something Else

If Democrat is selected: Do you consider yourself to be a strong Democrat, or not a very strong Democrat?
- Strong Democrat
- Not Very Strong Democrat
If Republican is selected: Do you consider yourself to be a strong Republican, or not a very strong Republican?
- Strong Republican
- Not a very strong Republican

If Something Else is selected: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party or Republican Party?
- Democratic Party
- Republican Party
- Neither
IV. Test Statistics for Balance in Covariates

We perform Hotelling’s T-squared test to check for balance in our covariates across experimental conditions. Specifically, the variables we control for are gender, age, education, income, partisanship, and ideology.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>F-Statistic</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blacks to Black Muslims</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks to Somalis</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks to Somali Muslims</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks to Muslims</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Muslims to Somali</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. Regression Analyses with Control Variables

Although our Hotelling test statistics in Section IV of this appendix indicate that there is balance in our treatment conditions, below we provide regression analyses with our control variables to further demonstrate that our findings remain the same.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Vote for Candidate to Increase Immigrants</th>
<th>(2) Worried Terrorist Attack</th>
<th>(3) Increase FS Defense</th>
<th>(4) Supports Temporary Ban of Refugees</th>
<th>(5) Supports Travel Ban</th>
<th>(6) Immigrants Take Jobs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black Muslims</td>
<td>-.06**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalis</td>
<td>-.08**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.07**</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali Muslims</td>
<td>-.06**</td>
<td>.07**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.06*</td>
<td>.07*</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>-.07**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.09***</td>
<td>.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.04*</td>
<td>-.03+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Female)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-.46***</td>
<td>.11+</td>
<td>.39***</td>
<td>.41***</td>
<td>.43***</td>
<td>.34***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Conservative)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>-.24***</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.16***</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>.12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Republican)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.25***</td>
<td>-.08*</td>
<td>-.19***</td>
<td>-.48***</td>
<td>-.34***</td>
<td>-.36***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.08**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.15***</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.60***</td>
<td>.50***</td>
<td>.38***</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>.33***</td>
<td>.66***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>547</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; *p<.01***; **p<.05**; *p<.10*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Somali Muslims Condition Compared to Black Muslims Condition</th>
<th>(1) Vote for Candidate to Increase Immigrants</th>
<th>(2) Worried Terrorist Attack</th>
<th>(3) Increase FS Defense</th>
<th>(4) Supports Temporary Ban of Refugees</th>
<th>(5) Supports Travel Ban</th>
<th>(6) Immigrants Take Jobs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somali Muslims</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.06*</td>
<td>.08**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.06*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) / Black Muslims (0)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Female)</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.08**</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Female)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology (Conservative)</td>
<td>-.46***</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>.47***</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>.29***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Conservative)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship (Republican)</td>
<td>-.32***</td>
<td>.22***</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.35***</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>.22***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Republican)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.29***</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.47***</td>
<td>-.30***</td>
<td>-.22**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.53***</td>
<td>.57***</td>
<td>.29***</td>
<td>.43***</td>
<td>.33***</td>
<td>.59***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; p<.01***; p<.05**; p<.10*