Black Rage and (Dis)Trust?:
Exploring How Anger Shapes Blacks' Trust in Government

Trust matters in democratic systems. The majority of research surrounding trust in the United States focuses on levels of political efficacy and evaluations of government from the perspective of White Americans, partisans, and ideological identifiers. Only recently have scholars begun to unpack the complex relationships involved in trust among racial and ethnic minorities, finding that for Black Americans, their levels of trust are attenuated by race and racial discrimination. Less understood are the roles of emotions in one's level of trust. In this paper, we argue that Blacks' anger underpins their levels of trust in government. We utilize data from the American National Election Study cumulative file to demonstrate how Blacks' level of trust in government have fluctuated over time. Data from the 2004 American National Study allows us to predict how Blacks' anger, as members of their racial group, shapes their levels of trust in government. Our results suggest that anger and Blacks' level of trust are closely intertwined and play a powerful role in how Blacks view their political representatives in governing institutions.

Camille D. Burge
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
Villanova University
E: camille.burge@villanova.edu

Shayla C. Nunnally
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
University of Connecticut
E: shayla.nunnally@uconn.edu

The more citizens trust their government, the better democracy functions (Putnam 1993; Putnam 2000). However, the overwhelming majority of research surrounding the role of trust in government focuses explicitly on Whites' trust in government or the extent to which one's trust might vary based on partisanship or ideological leaning. Only recently have scholars begun to unpack levels of trust in government among racial and ethnic minorities. For example, scholars studying the role of trust among Black Americans in the United States find that racial discrimination breaks down trust in democratic institutions. While differences in race between the perceiver and the person to be entrusted affect the extent of political trust in others, race also appears to be a major mechanism in determining political trust (Nunnally 2012).

We believe that race and racial discrimination may not be the only mechanisms underpinning trust in government in the Black community—that how one *feels* as a member of this marginalized racial group might further diminish levels of trust. Indeed, a burgeoning literature in public opinion suggests that anger among partisans shapes one's levels of trust (Webster 2017), but this theory has not been applied to Black Americans. In an effort to bridge that gap, we pose the following question: How and in what ways might anger shape Blacks' trust in government? Research surrounding Blacks' emotions in the political sphere has yet to explore the implications of anger as it pertains to trust in democratic institutions. We propose to do said, here.

Though studies on anger in politics abound, in the race and American politics literature, we see foci on the ways in which anger shapes the opinions and behavior of White Americans, with very little emphasis on Black people (White et al. 2007; Philpot et al. 2008). When White Americans are angry they are more likely to reject certain policies like healthcare reform (Tesler and Sears 2010; Tesler 2012; Banks 2013), adopt conservative stances on racial policies (Banks and Valentino 2012; Banks and Bell 2013), and increase their political participation (Marcus et al. 2000; Brader 2005, 2006; Valentino et al. 2011). Research surrounding the role of anger among Black Americans

2

suggests that Black people have collective emotional responses to racialized political events, like Hurricane Katrina and the O.J. Simpson verdict (Pew Research Center 2005; Dawson 2011; White et al. 2007; Philpot et al. 2008), and intra-and-intergroup violence (Burge and Johnson 2018). Yet, none of this literature explores the interconnections of anger and trust among Black Americans.

We aim to fill this void by understanding the ways in which anger shapes *Blacks'* attitudes about trust in government. Anecdotally, it seems that we may know a great deal about the role of Blacks' anger as it pertains to trust: Black people clearly seem to be angry about implicit and explicit racially discriminatory practices in hiring, promotion, policing, and additional inequities in the criminal justice system (Mabry and Kiecolt 2005; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010; Pittman 2011). Yet, extant literature lacks rigorous quantitative explorations about the interconnections between Black anger and trust in government.

To this end, our paper proceeds as follows: first, we outline research on the role of trust in government, focusing on the ways in which Black people differ from their White counterparts in their levels of efficacy and evaluations of government. Second, we broadly discuss the role of emotions in politics, in particular, how emotions shape political participation, policy opinions, and more recently, trust. Along the way, we also highlight the growing literature on Blacks' emotions in politics. We, then, draw on psychological theories of intergroup emotions to develop a theory as to how and why Blacks' anger should cause members of this community to lower their evaluations of the national government. Afterwards, we present evidence from the American National Election Study (ANES) Cumulative File to examine Blacks' levels of trust over time. Next, we focus exclusively on the 2004 American National Election Study, which asks a question about Blacks' anger, and use it to predict levels of trust in government. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings and avenues for future research.

The Role of Trust in Government

People are at the center of government. From the voices of people, democracy reigns true to its purpose—serving at the will of its citizens through representation and the concept of "popular sovereignty." It is because of people organizing on behalf of their interests that they are able to assemble, hopefully, peaceably, in groups that influence government through decision-making on their behalves by their elected representatives. Also, integral for this relationship between citizens and government is *trust*, for it makes democracy work (Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000).

Trust is an evaluation about the capacity of others, entities, or contexts (all considered *trustees*) to render positive or negative outcomes in their engagement with a *trustor* (or, the person who gauges trust). As an assessment, trust comprises the summation of benefits and risks in interacting with trustees, under which the perceived uncertainty about the extent to which benefits outweigh the risks, become important in evaluating the trustworthiness of the trustee (Bachrach and Gambetta 2001; Hardin 2002). To the trustor's benefit, cooperation, reciprocity, or, hopefully, positive tangible returns enhance not only the trusting relationship between the trustor and the trustee but also the likelihood of the trustor's perceived trustworthiness of the trustee (Ostrom and Walker 2003; Hardin 2001; Heimer 2001; Warren 1999; Luhmann 1988). Thus, trust evokes (1) *behavior*, (2) *context*, (3) perceived *outcomes*, and (4) perceived *risks* for determining its extent (Nunnally 2012). In this sense, trust is cognitive. However, what should be understood more in-depth, as we argue, is the affective side of trust.

Without a doubt in American society, *race* is a socially-constructed concept that induces cognition through recognition of group classification, attachments of valenced stereotypes, and valenced emotions. Because conceptually, race has these several effects, the bodies of persons on which race is ascribed can be perceived and reacted to differently. It is also through the conception of racialized and imbalanced power relations, institutionalized racial hierarchism (between Whites and

non-Whites), and institutionalized psychology and affect about White and non-White persons through science and society (Gossett 1997) that trusting relations can be inhibitive across racial groups and affect perceptions of racial uncertainty (Nunnally 2012; Orr 1999). This reinforces the need to examine race and trust through both cognitive and *affective* lenses. Moreover, given the historic nature of the Black-White dichotomy in U.S. race relations, it takes us to a salient point of examining the long-held distrusting attitudes of Black Americans towards the American political system (and as an extension of attitudes towards a predominantly-White system of political representation), in order to understand these attitudes beyond cognition and scrutinize the affective components of this group's distrust.

Blacks' (Dis)Trust of Government

Extant literature on trust examines *social trust* (or, generalized trust in others) and *political trust* (or, trust in political actors and political institutions). Notable among most of this literature is the decline over time in both social (Putnam 1995 and 2000; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Rahn and Transue 1998; Pew Research Center 2007) and political trust (Hetherington 2005; Pew Research Center 2010a and 2012), among Americans, with a lower-point in political trust first noted in modern politics in the mid-1960s (Vietnam-conflict era) and, a more precipitous decline, during the early-1970s (post-Watergate scandal). General upticks in American political trust have been noted during the Reagan administration, the first term of the Clinton administration, and immediately, after 9/11 (A. Miller 1974; Citrin 1974; Citrin and Green 1986; Orren 1997; Citrin and Luks 2001; Chanley 2002; Hardin 2004; Hetherington 2005; Pew Research Center 2010b); however, post-Great Recession in 2008, there has been an even sharper decline of political trust (Pew Research Center 2010 and 2015). With this said, despite the general trends of political trust for all Americans, there has been a long-held gap in political trust among Black Americans, compared to whites, especially, and other racial groups (Avery 2006 and 2009; Mangum 2012; Nunnally 2012).

Black people's distrust has been hypothesized, tested, and now, more broadly known to be oriented in the group's formalized experiences with racial discrimination on behalf of the state and persons in civil society. Earlier studies of Blacks' political trust (Abramson 1972; Aberbach and Walker 1970) questioned the extent to which political alienation from the political system, whether socialized through familial exchanges, experienced through negative citizen-government relations, or couched in disdainful attitudes about the group's inability to influence political responsiveness to communal interests, undergirded their distrust, and in specific eras of local politics, during the latter 1960s—urban unrest.

As later studies have also explored the significance of the race of political actors representing Black group interests and its role in promoting greater political engagement of Black group members (Shingles 1981; Miller et al. 1981; Swain 1993; Gay 2002; Tate 2003), not only does the perceived race of political actors make a difference in how Black Americans perceive the responsiveness of political institutions (Tate 2003), but also, it affects their political trust in partisan actors (Nunnally 2012).

In the context of American politics, Black people are also less trusting of White American political actors, even when they are Democrats—the political party subscribed to by almost 90 percent of Black Americans. Black Americans trust White Democrats less than Black partisans, whether these partisans are Democrats or Republicans (Nunnally 2012). In a nutshell, Black Americans are leery of the historical, racial discrimination experiences that their group members have had in their interactions with White Americans (Nunnally 2012). Thus, the ascription of race to political interests is not only a group-based, cognitive politics (Tate 1993; Dawson 1994; Kinder and Sanders 1996), it is also a politics that renders affection, based on the sensibilities and sensitivities of group experiences. It is disdain that makes one feel politically-alienated. We believe that it is anger from feelings of displacement, perceived indifference to one's political plight, and the perceived lack

6

of external efficacy to change the system in response to one's needs that make Black Americans respond in distrusting ways to the political system.

It also appears to be an ongoing history and contemporary experience of White political actors and members of civil society, who factor foremost in the positions of power and change, who seem resistant to political responsiveness that could render different outcomes in favor of Black Americans' political interests. To trust and to find others trustworthy has a racial and political component in America. It affects all racial groups, but for Black Americans, the perennial struggle for equality, inclusion, and justice above the frailties of racial discrimination make trusting the American political system and the actions of its elected officials and civil servants harder, because there is sociopolitical precedent.

Anger in Political Participation, Public Opinion, and Trust

If we are to understand the role of anger in Blacks' trust in government, we must first begin with a cogent psychology-oriented understanding of anger. Anger is defined as "a belief that we, or our friends, have been unfairly slighted, which causes in us both painful feelings and a desire or impulse for revenge" (Lazarus 1991, 217). Anger is a negative emotion, wherein blame for undesirable behavior and resulting undesirable events is directed at another person or group. Anger produces a desire to regain control, remove the obstruction, and if necessary, attack the source of injury (Cottam, Uhler, Mastors, and Preston 2010, 52). Banks (2014) states, "Anger is experienced when a person has been threatened and, more importantly, when an individual is certain about who's responsible (or blameworthy) for the offense" (20). If we blame someone for a wrongdoing it requires that we believe that the individual engaged in the slighting could have acted differently, that they had control over the offending action (Lazarus 1991).

A burgeoning literature in political science examines the implications of anger in politics.

7

Stemming from literature on Affective Intelligence Theory (AIT; Marcus et al 2000; Marcus 2002), many scholars have found that the experience of anger influences how one thinks and behaves in the political arena. Indeed, those studying anger have found that it shapes one's campaign involvement (Brader 2005, 2006; Valentino et al. 2009), voting behavior (Marcus et al 2000; Valentino et al 2011), and attitudes about immigration, health insurance, and affirmative action (Banks and Valentino 2007; Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Banks 2014). However, the overwhelming majority of this research uses observational and experimental data that examines anger at the individual level, as opposed to the group level. That is, researchers tend to use survey questions on the American National Election Study (ANES) that ask candidate-centric emotions questions[1] or recall-and-write emotion elicitation prompts that ask about the individual-level experience of anger. Yet, we know that politics are group-centric. Whether racial, religious, gender, partisan, or socioeconomic, groups matter in politics and shape how one thinks about policies, other groups, as well as one's political behavior.

Only recently have political psychology scholars begun to explore the possibility of group-centric emotions in politics. These recent studies examine affective polarization and how dislike for individuals in opposite parties might stimulate or constrain attitudes and behavior (Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Webster and Abramowitz 2017). Using the theory of mood-congruity (Bower 1991), which suggests that one's emotional state shapes the way in which one makes judgments about subsequent stimuli, Webster (2017) argues and finds that invoking anger, a negatively-valenced emotion, among partisans leads to negative evaluations of government. However, Webster's (2017)

---

[1] The survey questions often utilized in emotions and politics research asks respondents, "Has Barack Obama [insert political candidate] because of the kind of person he is or because of something he has done, ever made you feel angry/hopeful/afraid/anxious/proud?[1] Yes or no? How often?" These candidate-centric emotions questions do not provide the literature with a cogent understanding of the full functioning of emotions in the politics as they do not focus on the experience of emotions of members of groups.

findings focus exclusively on partisanship and do not examine how Black people might experience anger and the extent to which this anger has the propensity to influence their levels of trust.

Black Rage and (Dis)Trust of Government

In this paper, we argue that Blacks' lack of trust in government is fueled by anger, which undergirds their racial attitudes about mistreatment. In *Black Rage,* a critically-acclaimed work by two Black psychiatrists attempting to understand civil unrest among Black Americans in the 1960s, it was found that Black people in America were angry about the unwillingness of White Americans to "accept Negroes as fellow human beings" (Grier and Cobbs 1968, vii). These scholars argued that, although slavery ended, the inner-feelings of White superiority and Black inferiority among Whites remained. Subsequently, Whites' inner-feelings manifested in myriad ways in the public sphere but mainly in racially-discriminatory practices (i.e. explicit and implicit biases in employment, promotion, treatment by police, etc.) that affected Blacks' equal treatment.

Black Americans have a complex relationship to the American political system. As a group of people, who have been within the American polity, since its inception, this "partness" has been intricate and more specific, as far as the status of their citizenship as "persons," with equal rights versus "bodies" counted for representation purposes, without formal recognition as human beings, and rather, recognition as "property" (and, hence, enslaved persons) without the rights of citizens, whatsoever. Even with the legal provision of rights, Black Americans have faced the additional struggle of full-citizenship, per their contestation of legalized exclusion via Jim Crow.

To date, matters even become complex in their relationship to the American political system, as the group presses for protection against state-sanctioned violence against their group members (Taylor 2016; Lebron 2017). It is this understanding of "two-ness," being "Black" and "American" that DuBois (1903) describes as challenging for Blacks' identities. But, it is also in confronting the psychological disdain with the inability of group members to enjoy the full gamut of possibilities and

opportunities of social mobility, amid rights infringement at the personal and systemic levels that feeds emotional attitudes that Grier and Cobbs (1968) describe as "Black rage."

It is our goal, here, to define a keener aspect of Black people's disgruntlement with the American political system that manifests, as we claim it, as distrust. That is, we understand and contribute that an important aspect of predicting Black political trust includes accounting for the emotional side. More specifically, anger has a critical role in shaping Black political trust in the system to do what is right. This is a predictor, heretofore, not tested in Blacks' political trust. However, we do have clearer perspective about the racial lenses through which Black Americans perceive the American political system to do what is right for Black people, and we see that this aspect of trust is particularized and lower-expected in the capacity of White political actors, compared to Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans (Nunnally 2012).

To this extent, without having measures that are specific to the race of political actors performing their roles in government, depending on the context of government (local, state, or federal), wherein more racial and ethnic diversity are most likely at the local level of government, political trust attitudes are generalized over time towards state and federal political institutions that have been historically-operative as majority-White institutions. It is with one historic exception, the election of the nation's first Black U.S. President, which we may perhaps see the perception of federal government change, as far as it being "governed" by a non-white figurehead. For Black and White Americans, perceptions of this "political domination" by political actors with different racial backgrounds, we anticipate, produces "anger" from their racialized perspectives.

Why is anger, in particular, important? We see it as the flip-side of the same coin that has been studied particular to White Americans. It is an expression of strong dissatisfaction with the system's response to one's political interests and demands, but once again, perceived through racialized lenses. Black Americans are less politically-trusting than Whites (Rahn and Transue 1996;

10

Putnam 2000; Avery 2006 and 2009; Nunnally 2012), and this is a pattern that has followed for decades, until the Obama presidency, when we see Black political trust for the first time, outpace Whites' political trust (Pew Research Center 2010b). Racial discrimination experiences are an important determinant of Black political distrust (Avery 2006 and 2009), and Black Americans are less trusting of Whites, especially in the context of politics, as compared to social spaces (Nunnally 2012). However, we also believe, as we test here, that determination of the escalation in anger among Black Americans will distinguish who among this group is more distrusting in the political system.

As Whites perceive zero-sum political responses to their demands on the political system, and thus, shifting their racial attitudes towards the allocation of resources that become racialized as specific to non-Whites (Bobo and Hutchings 1996, Tesler and Sears 2010; Tesler 2012; Banks 2012), Black Americans, for example, sense a lock-out of the political system listening and responding to their concerns for equal protection of the law (otherwise, noted in the literature as "political alienation" (Jackson 1973)-- what has been and continues to be a life--and-death matter for their circumstances (Taylor 2016 and Lebron 2017).

Thus, while anger may affect both Whites' and Blacks' political behavior, the manifestation of this anger has different orientations, orientations that are not exclusive to feelings of political alienation. And, despite being race-related, the orientation of anger for Blacks pleads for recognition, inclusion, representation, and policy responsiveness--internal and external political efficacy, that, heretofore, lacks full affirmation, in a way that some Whites' calls for a return to status quo seeks equilibrium to a norm, wherein Whites are atop the racial hierarchy and receiving, arguably, greater attention and regards from the political system.

Toward a Cogent Theory: The Role of Anger in Blacks' Trust in Government

Extant research in psychology surrounding intergroup emotions can help us explain how Blacks' collective experiences of anger shape their levels of trust. Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET) posits that emotional responses to groups and social events depend on how the self is categorized (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; Yzerbyt and Demoulin 2010); that is, emotional reactions are in some way based on the experience of in-group membership (Parkinson, Fischer, and Manstead 2005, 116) and that the in-group and emotional response individuals give can change depending on the social categorization of the perceiver and the target group in an experimental setting. Psychologists Iyer and Leach state, "these type of emotions may be experienced about an outgroup's character or circumstances relative to the in-group or about the actions of the out-group and its implications for the in-group" (2009, 96). For example, when a group of students was categorized as Americans, respondents viewed Muslims as threatening and had negative emotions toward them. However, when the perceivers were categorized as students, they had more positive emotions towards Muslims (Ray et al. 2008). Thus, this theory suggests "activation of different social categorizations can dictate different emotional reactions to the same target group" (Ray et al. 2008, 1211). The key to this theory is categorization: How individuals categorize themselves has important implications for how they feel about members of different groups and even how they behave in basic human interactions (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2001).

Research surrounding the importance of categorization in one's behavior has its intellectual origins in studies on social identity theory. Tajfel (1982) defines a social identity as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his[her] knowledge of his [her] membership in a social group (groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (63). Tajfel and Turner (1986) are responsible for creating social identity theory, which argues that

individuals have a tendency to categorize themselves in terms of in-groups and out-groups, and it is this categorization that shapes group behavior.

In a series of minimal group experiments where Tajfel and Turner (1986) assigned individuals to meaningless groups (for example, dot over-counters or under-counters and those who preferred Kandinsky paintings over the work of Klee), they found that individuals were more likely to support the fictitious in-group that they were assigned to and speak disparagingly of individuals assigned to the out-group. However, the findings surrounding in-group bias, as it pertained to fictitious groups, did not translate well outside of the lab to real world groups with distinct histories and how they might interact with members of their own group and other groups. This desire to further understand group categorization in American politics is, in part, what led to the vast body of research on racial group consciousness.

We can apply the findings on intergroup emotions to Blacks' trust in government by utilizing a social identity theory framework. In America, the ascription of race, how people might categorize an individual, and the choice of racial identification, how one might categorize themselves, has consequences for how one has been treated by our democratic institutions as well as how one thinks and behaves in politics. We argue that Blacks' anger results in response to disparaging attitudes and practices perpetrated by Whites. Such anger is amplified when Whites are in positions of power (like government posts) to protect equality and justice and redress ill-treatment. Since research about trust in government among Black Americans finds that their trust is attenuated by race and racial discrimination, we believe that the natural response to continuing unequal treatment is anger and that, ultimately, it is anger that fuels Black Americans' distrust of government, especially when government does not respond in accordance with democratic principles.

Methods

To examine the ways in which anger shapes Blacks' trust in government, we turn to the American National Election Study (ANES). From 1948 to present day, this survey has asked canonical questions pertaining to Americans' trust and efficacy in our governing institutions. These questions include the following: "how often do you trust government to do what's right;" "if government is run by a few big interests or for the benefit of all;" "how many government officials are crooked;" "public officials don't care what people like me think;" and "people like me have no say in what government does." These data range from 1952 to present day. Each survey has approximately 150 to 170 Black respondents, with 2008 and 2012 containing oversamples of Black Americans.[2] We use these questions to understand how Blacks' trust in government has fluctuated over time.

To understand how group-centric anger influences Blacks' trust in government, we then turn to the 2004 ANES. The 2004 ANES is the only survey that asks, "How often do you feel angry about the way Blacks are treated in society?" We believe this question provides insights into the intergroup emotions theory that we argue underpins Blacks' trust in government. That is, this question is not asking about the individual experience of emotions but the rate at which Black people feel angry about how they are treated by the broader society. In previous work, Burge (n.d.) finds that "society" in this measure is a proxy for White people. We use this measure to predict Blacks' attitudes related to trust and efficacy in government.

Results I: Blacks' Trust Over Time

What do our findings from the ANES Cumulative file reveal about Blacks' trust in government? Figures 1 through 3 indicate that, although Blacks' level of trust in government has

---

[2] Descriptive statistics of the Black samples the ANES Cumulative File can be found in the Appendix.

fluctuated over time, Black people tend to be less trusting of government. The findings in Figure 1 suggest that Black people tend to trust the government to do what's right only "some of the time." However, it is notable that, from 1958-1969, the data reflect that Blacks trusted government to do what is right "most of the time." It is in 1970 that Blacks' attitudes mostly change to trust the government to do what is right "some of the time," a trend that continues through 2012.

Figure 1:
"How often do you trust government to do what's right?"


Note: Contains percentages of Black respondents' responses to each question from the 1958-2012 ANES Cumulative file

While the findings in Figure 2 indicate that Black people overwhelmingly believe that the federal government is "run by a few big interests," as opposed to "the benefit of all," the results in Figure 3 further suggest that Black respondents are also strongly inclined to believe that quite a few government officials are crooked.

Figure 2:
"Is federal government run by a few big interests or for the benefit of all?

Figure 3:
"How many government officials are crooked?"

The findings pertaining to efficacy in Figures 4 and 5 are a bit more varied. The results in Figure 4 indicate that Black people seem to agree with the statement that "government officials care about what they think" as persons. A mixture of peaks and valleys to the "agree" and "disagree" response options in Figure 5 portray a more complex reality surrounding the extent to which Blacks feel as though they have a say in what government does.

Figure 4:
"Government officials care what people like me think."

Note: Contains percentages of Black respondents' responses to each question from the 1958-2012 ANES Cumulative file

Figure 5:
"People like me have a say in what government does."

Note: Contains percentages of Black respondents' responses to each question from the 1958-2012 ANES Cumulative file

Results II: The Role of Group-Centric Anger in Blacks' Trust

We, now, turn our attention to the 2004 ANES, which contains the appropriate measure to gauge Blacks' anger as members of their racial group. The 2004 ANES contains 176 Black respondents whose ages range from 18 to 88. This sample contains 85 Black men and 91 Black women with the majority of respondents having a high school diploma and attending some college. First, we should investigate the distribution of responses to our key independent variable question, which asks, "How often do you feel angry about the way Blacks are treated in society? The response options range from "hardly ever" to "a lot." Figure 6 indicates that approximately 38.67% of

respondents say "a lot," 28.67% "fairly often," 31.33% "once in a while," and 1.33% say, "hardly ever." Figure 7 contains the Kernel Density distribution of anger among our Black respondents. Typically, when scholars use the Kernel Density distribution, they do so to underscore the even distribution of responses to survey questions. Our distribution in Figure 7 suggests that these responses are anything but normally distributed. In fact, there seems to be a major imbalance in how Black people are experiencing anger; this imbalance trends toward experiencing anger more often than not.

Figure 6:
"How often do Black respondents feel angry?"

Note: Based on Black respondents' responses to the question from the 2004 ANES

Figure 7: Kernel Density Distribution of Anger

Note: Based on Black respondents' responses to the question from the 2004 ANES

Not only should we be interested in understanding the distribution of responses, but we should also examine *who* is most likely to be angry. That is, are there certain segments of the Black population that are more or less inclined to feel angry at the way Blacks are treated in broader society? Our findings in Table 1 suggest that when compared to those Blacks ages 30 through 59, younger Black people tend to experience anger more frequently (p<.05), and strong Democrats are also more likely than Republicans to experience anger (p<.10). The finding surrounding age seems almost counterintuitive, given that older Black Americans are more likely to have lived in the United States during more open, public, and de jure segregation and discrimination. Nonetheless, we see that younger Blacks are more disgruntled, and this may well be a part of younger Blacks understanding that systemic discrimination should have subsided and possibly been obliterated altogether, due to the efforts of the Civil Rights Movement (Cohen 2010). But, Blacks continue to perceive racial discrimination against their group and racial disparities in outcomes and resources continue in various aspects of society (Nunnally 2012). However, for young people, there may be a

19

greater disdain, when they know that equality should be fact and a given, and not a continuing struggle for the group, post-civil rights era.

Table 1: Who is Most Likely to Be Angry	
Education	.14
	(.10)
Gender (Female)	.04
	(.05)
Age 18-29	.13**
	(.06)
Age 60 plus	.05
	(.06)
South	-.03
	(.04)
Income	-.09
	(.08)
Partisanship (Strong Democrat)	.20*
	(.11)
Constant	.45***
	(.10)
N	149
R^2	.07

*Note: Standardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; All variables are rescaled from 0 to 1 for comparability; Model based on Black respondents' responses to questions from the 2004 ANES; ***p<.01; **p<.05;*p<.10*

Table 2 contains the answers to our primary research inquiry: How well does anger predict attitudes related to trust and efficacy in government? [3] The short answer to that question is, "Very well." Our results, herein, indicate that anger predicts various aspects of Black distrust—the perceptions that "government is run by big interests," "government officials are crooked," "public officials don't care what people like me think," and "people like me don't have any say in what government does"—all the measures that we tested, with the exception of "trust in the government to do what is right," for which there is no statistically-significant effect. Of all our tested predictors, anger also was the most consistent, statistically-significant indicator. Indeed, affect—emotions

---

[3] See Appendix for distribution of our trust and efficacy measures.

expressed as anger—majorly influence and predict, unlike any other demographic indicator, Blacks'
political trust.

Table 2:
Predictive Validity of Anger on Trust and Efficacy Variables

	Trust Government to Do What's Right	Government Run By Big Interests	Government Officials Are Crooked	Public Officials Don't Care What People Like Me Think	People Like Me Don't Have Any Say in What Government Does
Angry	-.01	.31***	.20**	.44***	.38***
	(.04)	(.11)	(.09)	(.08)	(.08)
Education	.11*	-.00	.22	-.13	-.28***
	(.06)	(.15)	(.14)	(.10)	(.10)
Gender (Female)	-.04	-.08	-.04	.04	-.01
	(.03)	(.07)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Age 30-59	-.03	.04	-.02	.00	.05
	(.04)	(.11)	(.08)	(.05)	(.06)
Age 60 plus	-.05	.19	-.00	.01	.11
	(.05)	(.12)	(.09)	(.08)	(.07)
South	.01	-.27***	.00	-.03	-.04
	(.02)	(.06)	(.06)	(.04)	(.04)
Income	.00	.29***	.01	.09	.03
	(.05)	(.15)	(.10)	(.07)	(.08)
Partisanship (Strong Democrat)	-.19***	.31*	.14	-.14	.02
	(.06)	(.18)	(.10)	(.11)	(.11)
Constant	.60***	.27	.36***	.45***	.34***
	(.08)	(.18)	(.13)	(.12)	(.13)
N	172	172	169	171	171
R^2	.11	.22	.08	.20	.17

Note: Standardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; All variables are rescaled from 0 to 1 for comparability; Model based on Black respondents' responses to questions from the 2004 ANES; ***p<.01; **p<.05;*p<.10

Discussion and Conclusion

We developed our paper from the frame that understanding Black political trust involves

discerning both its cognitive and affective components. First, we provide evidence of the long-

standing trend of Blacks trusting in government "some of the time," using data from the 1958-2012

American National Election Studies Cumulative File. However, prior to 1970, interestingly, during a

time of formal segregation being present and subsiding with policy changes for racial inclusion (the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968), Blacks report trusting in government "most of the time."

While we understand the history of racial discrimination and perceptions of different non-Black groups being part and parcel of Blacks' cognition of political trust, the literature, heretofore, has not considered the *affective* effect of anger in this group's distrust. Thus, here, we examine the effect of anger on Blacks' political trust. Our analyses of Black public opinion shows us that anger influences Black political trust. But, from this major finding, we still must ask, "Is this effect only indicative of a cross-section, or do we find this effect to be evident over time?" Our ability to answer this question, however, is limited by the questions that have been posed in the ANES, for as we described, only the 2004 survey, however, contains this measure. Thus, we are limited by our data. Nevertheless, we propose testing other emotions in more thorough and causal ways in the future. However, starting with anger, we have a historical (and contemporary) lens from which Blacks express disdain with their sociopolitical predicament, as Black racial group members.

With the significance of anger being greatest among young Black Americans, we also have a basis for which to consider generational analyses in future tests of affect in predicting political trust. Especially, with the heightened racial discourses in larger American society, emotions likely run very-highly in various Black subgroups' perceptions of the American political system. Trust, however, is a delicate aspect of sociopolitical capital, that, without it, the political system's effectiveness may well hang in the balance. In future determinacies, such anger may well have different predictive effects in types of Black political participation.

I. *ANES Cumulative File Descriptive Statistics*

	1948	1952	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968	1970	1972
Education											
0-8 grades (grade school or less)	71.67%	66.08%	52.05%	52.80%	50.52%	54.05%	38.99%	37.50%	39.60%	35.17%	26.97%
High school	25%	26.90%	39.73%	33.60%	36.08%	36.04%	46.54%	52.21%	45.64%	55.86%	52.43%
Some college (13 grades or more)	3.33%	2.92%	3.42%	8.00%	7.22%	5.41%	8.18%	9.56%	8.05%	3.45%	13.48%
College or Advanced Degree		3.51%	3.42%	5.60%	5.15%	4.50%	5.66%		6.71%	3.45%	7.12%
Income											
0 to 16 percentile	38.33%	48.54%	43.84%	43.20%	40.21%	42.34%	37.74%	36.03%	29.53%	32.41%	36.70%
17 to 33 percentile	25%	20.47%	31.51%	28.80%	25.77%	16.22%	21.38%	11.76%	23.49%	24.14%	16.48%
34 to 67 percentile	26.67%	21.05%	19.18%	17.60%	18.56%	28.83%	20.75%	28.68%	24.16%	26.21%	28.09%
68 to 95 percentile	10%	9.36%	4.79%	6.40%	14.43%	7.21%	13.84%	19.12%	14.09%	13.10%	13.86%
96 to 100 percentile						2.70%	2.52%	0.74%	1.34%	0.69%	1.12%
Gender											
Male	40%	44.44%	38.36%	44.80%	42.27%	39.64%	33.96%	44.12%	37.58%	35.86%	38.20%
Female	60%	55.56%	61.64%	55.20%	57.73%	60.36%	66.04%	55.88%	62.42%	64.14%	61.80%
Region											
Northeast		15.20%	16.44%	20%	19.59%	22.52%	15.72%	19.12%	16.78%	11.72%	20.97%
North Central		9.94%	17.12%	18.40%	15.46%	17.12%	20.75%	32.35%	21.48%	20.00%	14.98%
South		67.25%	56.85%	52.80%	56.70%	53.15%	61.01%	42.65%	52.35%	57.24%	59.18%
West		7.60%	9.59%	8.80%	8.25%	7.21%	2.52%	5.88%	9.40%	11.03%	4.87%
Partisanship											
Strong Democrat		30.41%	26.71%	29.60%	26.80%	34.23%	50.94%	28.68%	55.70%	43.45%	36.33%
Weak Democrat		19.88%	23.29%	20.80%	20.62%	24.32%	21.38%	30.15%	28.86%	33.79%	30.71%
Lean Democrat		9.94%	5.48%	5.60%	5.15%	3.60%	8.18%	11.03%	6.71%	7.59%	7.87%
Independent		2.34%	6.85%	4.80%	11.34%	6.31%	5.66%	13.97%	2.68%	10.34%	13.86%
Lean Republican		3.51%	0.68%	3.20%	4.12%	1.80%	0.63%	1.47%	0.67%		3.37
Weak Republican		8.19%	11.64%	8.80%	10.31%	7.21%	5.03%	6.62%	0.67%	4.14%	3.75%
Strong Republican		4.68%	6.85%	7.20%	7.22%	6.31%	1.89%	2.21%	1.34%		3.75%

	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994
Education											
0-8 grades (grade school or less)	32.39%	29.02%	19.83%	21.31%	21.85%	14.11%	14.97%	12.36%	12.99%	12.58%	9.23%
High school	47.89%	47.32%	56.47%	56.83%	48.34%	54.84%	53.50%	54.83%	56.30%	52.58%	50.77%
Some college (13 grades or more)	11.97%	17.86%	15.95%	16.39%	19.87%	21.77%	19.43%	21.24%	18.50%	20.32%	28.21%
College or Advanced Degree	7.04%	5.36%	6.90%	5.46%	9.93%	8.47%	10.83%	10.04%	11.42%	13.55%	9.74%
Income											
0 to 16 percentile	33.80%	36.61%	30.17%	28.42%	33.77%	32.26%	29.94%	38.61%	25.98%	24.19%	30.77%
17 to 33 percentile	22.54%	20.09%	20.59%	19.13%	17.88%	18.15%	19.11%	12.36%	21.26%	22.90%	17.95%
34 to 67 percentile	26.76%	21.43%	18.10%	22.95%	21.85%	23.79%	26.75%	26.64%	24.02%	21.29%	23.08%
68 to 95 percentile	12.68%	13.39%	9.91%	13.11%	15.23%	12.90%	9.87%	15.44%	17.32%	18.71%	16.41%
96 to 100 percentile		0.45%	1.29%		0.66%	0.81%	2.23%		1.18%	1.61%	0.51%
Gender											
Male	32.39%	32.59%	34.48%	39.89%	37.75%	34.27%	41.72%	32.05%	38.58%	39.68%	41.03%
Female	67.61%	67.41%	65.52%	60.11%	62.25%	65.73%	58.28%	67.95%	61.42%	60.32%	58.97%
Region											
Northeast	15.49%	16.96%	14.22%	17.49%	15.89%	13.71%	20.38%	12.36%	9.45%	16.77%	22.56%
North Central	16.90%	16.96%	19.40%	19.67%	21.19%	17.74%	14.97%	17.76%	14.96%	12.90%	10.26%
South	61.97%	57.59%	57.76%	52.46%	54.97%	60.48%	57.64%	61.39%	65.35%	61.29%	60.51%
West	5.63%	8.48%	8.62%	10.38%	7.95%	8.06%	7.01%	8.49%	10.24%	9.03%	6.67%
Partisanship											
Strong Democrat	42.96%	34.82%	35.78%	45.90%	50.99%	32.36%	42.68%	38.61%	39.76%	41.94%	38.46%
Weak Democrat	24.65%	34.82%	27.59%	27.32%	24.50%	31.05%	28.98%	23.55%	22.44%	22.58%	22.56%
Lean Democrat	14.79%	13.84%	15.09%	9.29%	11.92%	13.31%	12.42%	17.37%	15.75%	12.58%	21.03%
Independent	11.27%	8.93%	10.78%	9.84%	5.96%	12.50%	8.60%	7.72%	9.45%	15.48%	7.69%
Lean Republican	0.70%	1.34%	2.16%	3.28%	1.32%	5.65%	2.23%	5.02%	7.09%	2.58%	4.10%
Weak Republican	0.70%	2.68%	2.59%	1.64%	1.99%	1.21%	2.23%	5.02%	2.36%	2.90%	2.05%
Strong Republican	2.82%	1.79%	2.59%	2.73%		2.42%	1.59%	1.54%	1.97%	1.61%	3.08%

	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2008	2012
Education								
0-8 grades (grade school or less)	9.23%	6.81%	6.25%	5.56%	1.48%	4.55%	4.29%	1.95%
High school	50.77%	52.36%	45.14%	46.97%	40%	42.05%	53.57%	37.68%
Some college (13 grades or more)	28.21%	30.37%	29.86%	30.81%	34.07%	36.36%	28.93%	37.88%
College or Advanced Degree	9.74%	10.47%	18.75%	16.67%	23.70%	17.05%	12.86%	21.52%
Income								
0 to 16 percentile	30.77%	32.98%	21.53%	29.80%		22.73%	30.36%	29.70%
17 to 33 percentile	17.95%	24.08%	23.61%	20.20%		20.45%	23.21%	18.99%
34 to 67 percentile	23.08%	21.47%	34.03%	21.72%		26.14%	27.32%	32.72%
68 to 95 percentile	16.41%	10.47%	15.97%	10.10%		10.80%	8.93%	11.98%
96 to 100 percentile	0.51%	0.52%	0.69%	1.01%		4.55%	0.71%	2.53%
Gender								
Male	41.03%	38.74%	34.03%	38.89%	40.00%	48.30%	40.36%	42.65%
Female	58.97%	61.26%	65.97%	61.11%	60.00%	51.70%	59.64%	57.35%
Region								
Northeast	22.56%	18.32%	13.89%	12.12%	11.85%	13.07%	10.18%	18.01%
North Central	10.26%	10.99%	18.06%	14.65%	17.04%	17.61%	21.43%	15.48%
South	60.51%	65.45%	63.19%	67.68%	62.96%	63.07%	60.36%	59.79%
West	6.67%	5.24%	4.86%	5.56%	8.15%	6.25%	8.04%	6.72%
Partisanship								
Strong Democrat	38.46%	43.46%	47.22%	43.43%	49.63%	30.68%	49.46%	59.01%
Weak Democrat	22.56%	23.56%	25.00%	22.22%	19.26%	30.11%	21.07%	15.29%
Lean Democrat	21.03%	14.14%	10.42%	15.66%	17.04%	21.02%	14.82%	13.44%
Independent	7.69%	11.52%	9.03%	11.62%	5.19%	10.80%	7.86%	7.50%
Lean Republican	4.10%	4.71%	4.17%	3.54%	0.74%	5.11%	2.14%	1.46%
Weak Republican	2.05%	1.57%	2.08%	3.03%	4.44%	1.14%	0.89%	1.56%
Strong Republican	3.08%	0.52%	1.39%	0.51%	1.48%	0.57%	0.89%	1.17%

Distribution of Responses to Key Trust and Efficacy Questions

How often do you trust the government to do what is right?


Is government run by a few big interests or the benefit of all?

How many crooked officials are in government?

Public officials don't care what people like me think.

People like me have no say in what government does.

References

Aberbach, Joel D. and Jack L. Walker. 1970. The Meanings of Black Power: A Comparison of White and Black Interpretations of a Political Slogan. In *American Political Science Review* 64: 367-388.

Abramson, Paul. 1972. Political Efficacy and Political Trust among Black School Children: Two Explanations. *Journal of Politics* 34: 1243-1275.

Avery, James M. 2006. The Sources and Consequences of Political Mistrust among African Americans. *American Politics Research* 34(5): 653-682

_____. 2009. Political Mistrust among African Americans and Support for the Political System. *Political Research Quarterly* 62: 132-145.

Bachrach, Michael and Diego Gambetta. 2001. Trust in Signs. In *Trust in Society*, ed. Karen S. Cook, 148-184. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Banks, Antoine J. 2014. The Public' Anger: White Racial Attitudes and Opinions Toward Health Care Reform. *Political Behavior* 36: 493-514.

Banks, Antoine and Bell. 2013. Racialized Campaign Ads: The Emotional Content in Implicit Racial Appeals Primes White Racial Attitudes. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 77(2) 549-560.

Banks, Antoine and Nicholas A. Valentino. 2012. Emotional Substrates of White Racial Attitudes. *American Journal of Political Science* 56(2): 286-297.

Bobo, Lawrence and Vincent Hutchings. 1996. Perceptions of Racial Group Competition: Extending Blumer's Theory of Group Position to a Multicultural Social Context. *American Sociological Review* 58(4); 443-464.

Bower, Gordon H. 1981. "Mood and Memory." *American Psychologist* 36:129-148.

Brader, Ted. 2005. "Striking a Responsive Chord: How Political Ads Motivate and Persuade Voters by Appealing to Emotions. *American Journal of Political Science* 49:388-405.

Brader, Ted. 2006. *Campaigning for Hearts and Minds: How Emotional Appeals in Political Ads Work.* University of Chicago Press.

Brehm, John and Wendy Rahn. 1997. Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital. *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (July): 999-1023.

Burge, Camille D. and Gbemende Johnson. 2018. "Race, Crime, and Emotions." *Research & Politics*

Citrin, Jack. 1974. Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government. *American Political* Science Review 68(3): 973-988.

Citrin, Jack and Donald Philip Green. 1986. Presidential Leadership and the Resurgence of Trust in Government. *British Journal of Political Science* 16(4): 431-453.

Citrin, Jack and Samantha Luks. 2001. Political Trust Revisited: Deja Vu All Over Again? In *What Is It About Government That Americans Dislike?*, eds. John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, 9-27. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chanley, Virginia. 2002. Trust in Government in the Aftermath of 9/11: Determinants and Consequences of Public Trust in Government: A Time Series Analysis. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 64(3): 239-256.

Cohen, Cathy J. *Democracy Remixed: Black Youth and the Future of American Politics.* Oxford University Press.

Cottam, Martha, Beth Dietz-Uhler, Elena M. Mastors, and Thomas Preston. 2004. *Introduction to Political Psychology.* Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Dawson, Michael C. 1994. *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

_____. 2011. *Not in Our Lifetimes: The Future of Black Politics.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Du Bois, W.E.B. 1903 [Reprint 1986]. The Souls of Black Folk. In *Writings: The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade, The Souls of Black Folk, Dusk of Dawn, Essays and Articles*. New York: Literary Classics.

Gay, Claudine. 2002. Spirals of Trust? The Effect of Descriptive Representation on the Relationship between Citizens and Government. *American Journal of Political Science* 46(4): 717-732.

Gossett, Thomas F. 1997. *Race: The History of an Idea in America*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Grier, William H. and Price M. Cobbs. 1968. *Black Rage*. Basic Books.

Hardin, Russell. 2001. Conceptions and Explanations of Trust. In *Trust in Society*, ed. Karen S. Cook, 3-39. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

_____. 2004. Introduction to *Distrust*, ed. Russell Hardin. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Heimer, Carol. 2001. Solving the Problem of Trust. In *Trust in Society*, ed. Karen A. Cook. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Hetherington, Marc. 2005. *Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Iyengar, Shanto and 2015. "Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization. *American Journal of Political Science* 59:690-707.

Iyer, Aarti and Colin Wayne Leach. 2009. "Emotion in Inter-Group Relations." *European Review of Social Psychology* 19:86-125.

Jackson, John S. 1973. Alienation and Black Political Participation. *The Journal of Politics*, 35 (4; Nov.), 849-885.

Kenworthy, Jared Bowden, Alberto Voci, Ananthi Al Ramiah, Nicole Tausch, Joanne Hughes, and Miles Hewstone. 2016. Building Trust in a Postconflict Society: An Interactive Model of Cross-group Friendship and Intergroup Emotions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60(6): 1041-1070.

Kinder, Donald R. and Lynn Sanders. 1996. *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lazarus, Richard L. 1991. *Emotion and Adaptation*. New York: Guilford Press.

Lebron, Chris. 2017. *The Making of Black Lives Matter: The History of an Idea*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Luhmann, Niklas. 1988. Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives. In *Trust*, ed. Diego Gambetta, 94-107. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

MacKuen, Michael, Jennifer Wolak, Luke Keele, and George E. Marcus. 2010. Civic Engagements: Resolute Partisanship or Reflective Deliberation. *American Journal of Political Science* 54(2): 440-458.

Mabry, J. Beth and K. Jill Kiecolt. 2005. "Anger in Black and White: Race, Alienation, and Anger." *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 46:85-101.

Mackie, Diane M., Thierry Devos, and Eliot R. Smith. 2000. "Intergroup Emotions: Explaining Offensive Action Tendencies in an Intergroup Context." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 79: 602-616.

Mangum, Maruice. 2012. Explaining African-American Political Trust: Examining Psychological Involvement, Policy Satisfaction, and Reference Group Effects. *International Social Science Review* 87 (1&2): 3-18.

Marcus, George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. 2000. *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Marcus, George E. 2002. *The Sentimental Citizen: Emotion in Democratic Politics*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Miller, Arthur H. 1974. Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970. *American Political Science Review* 68 (3): 951-972.

Miller, Arthur H., Patricia Gurin, Gerald Gurin, and Oksana Malanchuk. 1981. Group Consciousness and Political Participation. *American Journal of Political Science* 25(3): 494-511.

Nunnally, Shayla C. 2012. *Trust in Black America: Race, Discrimination, and Politics*. New York: New York University.

Orr, Marion. 1999. *Black Social Capital: The Politics of School Reform in Baltimore, 1986-1998*. Lawrence: University of Kansas.

Orren, Gary. 1997. Fall from Grace: The Public's Loss of Faith in Government. In *Why People Don't Trust Government*, eds. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Philip D. Zeliklow, and David C. King, 77-107. Cambridge: Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Ostrom, Elinor and James Walker. 2003. Introduction to *Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research*, eds. Elinor Ostrom and James Walker, 3-18. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Parkinson, Brian, Agneta H. Fischer, and Antony S.R. Manstead. 2005. *Emotion in Social Relations: Cultural, group, and Interpersonal Processes*. New York: Psychology Press.

Peffley, Mark and Jon Hurwitz. 2010. *Justice in America: The Separate Realities of Blacks and Whites*. Cambridge University Press.

Pew Research Center. 2005. Huge Racial Divide over Katrina and Its Consequences. 8 September. http://www.people-press.org/2005/09/08/two-in-three-critical-of-bushs-relief-efforts/ (August 11, 2018).

Pew Research Center. 2007. *Americans and Social Trust: Who, Where, and Why*. Social Trends Report. 22 February. http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2007/02/22/americans-and-social-trust-who-where-and-why/ (August 11, 2018).

Pew Research Center. 2010a. The People and Their Government: Distrust, Discontent, Anger, and Partisan Rancor. 18 April. http://www.people-press.org/reports/pdf/606.pdf (August 11, 2018).

Pew Research Center. 2010b. A Year after Obama's Election: Blacks Upbeat about Black Progress, Prospects. 12 January. http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/01/12/blacks-upbeat-about-black-progress-prospects/ (August 11, 2018).

Pew Research Center Report. 2015. "Beyond Distrust: How Americans View Their Government." 23 November. http://www.people-press.org/2015/11/23/beyond-distrust-how-americans-view-their-government/ (April 8, 2018).

Philpot, Tasha S., Ismail K. White, Kristin Wylie, and Ernest B. McGowen. "Feeling Different: Racial Group-Based Emotional Response to Political Events" in *African-American Political Psychology: Identity, Opinion, and Action in the Post-Civil Rights Era.* Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. 2010. 55-70.

Pittman, Chavella T. 2011. "Getting Mad But Ending Up Sad: The Mental Health Consequences for African-Americans Using Anger to Cope with Racism." *Journal of Black Studies* 42:1106-1124.

Putnam, Robert. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

_____. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Ray, Devin G., Diane M. Mackie, Robert J. Rydell, and Eliot R. Smith. 2008. "Changing Categorization of Self Can Change Emotions about Outgroups." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 44:1210-1213

Shingles, Richard D. 1981. Black Group Consciousness and Political Participation: The Missing

Link. *American Political Science Review* 75(1): 76-91.

Swain, Carol. 1993. *Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress.* Cambridge: Harvard University.

Tajfel, Henri. 1982. Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. In *Annual Review of Psychology* 33: 1-30.

Tajfel, Henri and Turner, J. C. 1986. The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour. eds., S. Worchel & W.G. Austin. Chicago: Nelson. In *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. pp. 7-24.

Tate, Katherine. 1993. *From Protest to Politics: The New Black Politics in American Elections.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

_____. 2003. *Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and Their Representatives in the U.S. Congress.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Taylor, Keeanga-Yamahtta. 2016. *From #BlackLives Matter to Black Liberation.* Chicago: Haymarket Books.

Tesler, Michael. 2012. The Spillover of Racialization into Healthcare: How President Obama Polarized Public Opinion by Race and Racial Attitudes. *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3) 690-704.

Tesler, Michael and Donald Sears. 2010. *Obama's Race: The 2008 Election and the Dream of a Post-Racial America.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Valentino, Nicholas A., Krysha Gregorowicz, and Eric W. Groenendyk. 2009. "Efficacy, Emotions, and the Habit of Participation." *Political Behavior* 31: 307-330.

Valentino, Nicholas, Ted Brader, Eric W. Groenendyk, Krysha Gregorowicz, and Vincent L. Hutchings. 2011. Election Night's Alright for Fighting: The Role of Emotions in Political Participation. *The Journal of Politics* 73: 156-170.

Warren, Mark E. 1999. Introduction to *Democracy and Trust*, ed. Mark E. Warren. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Webster, Steven W. 2017. "Anger and Declining Trust in Government in the American Electorate." https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-017-9431-7.

Webster, Steven W. and Alan I. Abramowitz. 2017. ""The Ideological Foundations of Affective Polarization in the U.S. Electorate." American Politics Research 45: 621-647.

White, Ismail K., Tasha Philpot, Kristin Wylie, and Ernest McGowen. 2007. "Feeling the Pain of My People: Hurricane Katrina, Racial Inequality, and the Psyche of Black America." *Journal of Black Studies* 37: 523-538

Yzerbyt, V.Y. and S. Demoulin. 2010. "Intergroup Relations." In *Handbook of Social Psychology,* eds. S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert and G. Lindzey, pp. 1024-1083. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.